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INTRODUCTION 
Defendants’ legal arguments rest on five novel propositions that lack support 
in the text, history, or related Supreme Court jurisprudence of the Commerce or 
Necessary and Proper Clauses: 
1. Congress can regulate all Americans now, and indefinitely, because 
they continuously engage in an economic activity throughout their 
adult lives. 
 
2. Congress can regulate all Americans now, and indefinitely, because 
an individual’s one-time purchase of goods or services in a market 
makes him a lifetime “market participant.” 
 
3. Congress can regulate all Americans now, and indefinitely, based on 
their anticipated economic activity at some undetermined point in the 
future. 
 
4. Congress can regulate all Americans now, and indefinitely, because 
some Americans will eventually engage in an economic activity that 
results in cost-shifting. 
 
5. Congress can mandate that all Americans enter a market now, and 
remain in that market indefinitely, to benefit voluntary market 
participants or prevent adverse consequences of Congress’s regulation 
of that market. 
 
 The novelty and broad reach of these arguments counsel strongly against 
their validity.  See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (“if . . . 
earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive power, we would have 
reason to believe that the power was thought not to exist.”); Texas Br. 7-11.  The 
Sixth Circuit’s recent decision upholding Section 1501 of the PPACA by a 2-1 
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vote relies on the same novel, flawed arguments.  TMLC v. Obama, 2011 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 13265 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 By contrast, Plaintiffs’ arguments are grounded in the Constitution and the 
Supreme Court’s cases.  Congress may regulate individuals who are voluntarily 
engaging in a commercial or economic activity, but the Commerce Clause does not 
authorize Congress to mandate that individuals who are not presently engaged in a 
particular commercial or economic activity must do so indefinitely.  Lawful 
presence in the United States, which triggers Section 1501’s mandate to buy and 
indefinitely maintain health insurance unless otherwise exempted, is not an 
ongoing commercial or economic activity akin to operating a business or growing 
wheat. 
 Defendants acknowledge the de novo review applicable to the dismissal of 
Plaintiffs’ claims, Defs.’ Br. 21, but attempt to wrap their legal arguments in a 
cloak of deference and rational basis review.  Defs.’ Br. 17, 19, 22, 23, 37.  The 
terminology Defendants rely upon refers to deference given to Congress’s 
“empirical and operational judgments,” Defs.’ Br. 23, not to Defendants’ legal 
characterization of undisputed facts.  Thus, Defendants’ novel interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause and their legal characterization of lawfully residing in the 
United States without health insurance as an “economic activity” are not entitled to 
deference.  Merely incorporating a legal argument into a Congressional “finding” 
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does not make it a factual determination entitled to deference.  Contrary to 
Defendants’ view, the federal judiciary is empowered to independently examine 
the constitutionality of Congressional action.  See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Defendants’ alternative argument that Section 1501’s shared responsibility 
payment is authorized by Congress’s taxing power is flawed and has been rejected 
by every court to consider it.  Also, Defendants have not countered Plaintiffs’ 
arguments that the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, U.S. Const. Art. 
I, § 8, do not authorize Congress to compel millions of Americans to purchase a 
product.  Moreover, Defendants have not shown that Plaintiffs Lee and Seven-Sky 
failed to sufficiently allege that Section 1501 substantially burdens their religious 
exercise, nor have Defendants shown that the individual mandate, as applied to Lee 
and Seven-Sky, is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling 
governmental interest. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SECTION 1501 IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS’S TAXING 
POWER. 
 
 In making their alternative argument that Section 1501 is supported by 
Congress’s taxing power, Defs.’ Br. 53-59, Defendants fail to mention that, in 
addition to the district court here, every court to consider this argument has 
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squarely rejected it.  JA 158-61; TMLC, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13265, at *53-64 
(Sutton, J., concurring); id. at *100 (Graham, J., dissenting); Goudy-Bachman v. 
HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6309, at *28-33 (M.D. Pa. 2011); Liberty Univ. v. 
Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 627-29 (W.D. Va. 2010); U.S. Citizens Ass’n v. 
Sebelius, 754 F. Supp. 2d 903, 909, 911-24 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Virginia v. Sebelius, 
728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 782-88 (E.D. Va. 2010); TMLC v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 
882, 890-91 (E.D. Mich. 2010); Florida v. HHS, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1130-44 
(N.D. Fla. 2010). 
 When a court is presented with the question of which Congressional 
power(s) a statute was enacted under, the character of the statute is determinative, 
not the federal government’s characterization of the statute during litigation.  Ry. 
Execs. Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1982).  The character of Section 
1501’s penalty is clearly one of a regulatory penalty, not a tax, as multiple courts 
have concluded:  (1) Congress replaced the term “tax” with the term “penalty” in 
the final version of Section 1501; (2) Congress used the term “tax” to describe 
other exactions in the PPACA; (3) Congress expressly relied on its Commerce 
Clause power, not its taxing power, to enact Section 1501; (4) Congress deleted 
traditional IRS enforcement methods (criminal penalties, liens, and levies) for 
failure to pay the penalty; and (5) Congress did not identify in the PPACA any 
revenue that would be raised from this penalty, whereas Congress specifically 
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listed seventeen other revenue-generating provisions in the PPACA.  TMLC, 2011 
U.S. App. LEXIS 13265, at *53-64 (Sutton, J., concurring); Florida, 716 F. Supp. 
2d at 1139-40; Virginia, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 782-88; Texas Br. 25-29; Willis Br. 4-
29.  Defendants’ citation to snippets of legislative history does not override the 
overwhelming evidence that Section 1501’s “penalty” was enacted as a regulatory 
measure to support the mandate to buy and maintain health insurance and is not a 
tax.  See Defs.’ Br. 55-56. 
Further undercutting Defendants’ taxing power argument is Defendants’ 
purposeful waiver in the district court of their flawed argument that the Anti-
Injunction Act bars this action.  JA 98, 104 n.1.  The Anti-Injunction Act applies to 
taxes and related collection penalties.  26 U.S.C. § 7421(a); Liberty Univ., 753 F. 
Supp. 2d at 627-29; Florida, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1140-44.  If Defendants had a 
viable argument that Section 1501’s penalty is a tax, they would not have 
abandoned their Anti-Injunction Act argument. 
 In sum, Section 1501 contains a regulatory penalty, not a tax, as every court 
has correctly concluded.1/ 
                                                 
1/ A footnote in Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 
(1973), Defs.’ Br. 57-58, stating that the Court had abandoned “distinctions 
between regulatory and revenue-raising taxes” is dicta and did not overturn cases 
distinguishing taxes from regulatory penalties.  E.g., Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth 
Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779, 784 (1994) (relying on the difference between a tax and 
a penalty in concluding that a Montana “tax” was an unconstitutional penalty). 
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II. DEFENDANTS’ ARGUMENTS BASED ON THE COMMERCE AND 
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSES ARE FLAWED AND LACK 
LEGAL SUPPORT. 
 
A. Congress may regulate ongoing commercial and economic 
activities, not decisions or inaction. 
 
 Defendants agree that Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause 
extends to “activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.”  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 
(2005); Defs.’ Br. 2, 16, 22.  That commercial or economic activity is the proper 
subject of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce is not a formalistic or 
artificial limitation, but comes directly from the text and history of the Commerce 
Clause.  The power to regulate “commerce,” that is, the power to “prescribe the 
rule by which commerce is to be governed,” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
1, 196 (1824), when viewed in light of our tradition of a capitalist free-market 
economy, is the power to regulate the voluntary sale or exchange of goods and 
services.  There is no American tradition of forcing unwilling individuals to 
operate a business or buy a good or service in the name of “regulating commerce,” 
and it is not a coincidence that the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause cases 
upholding regulation under the “substantial effects” test have involved the 
regulation of ongoing commercial or economic activities, unlike Section 1501. 
 Nothing in law or logic supports Defendants’ novel extension of this federal 
regulatory authority to mere inaction, decisions, or thought processes that relate to 
USCA Case #11-5047      Document #1320407      Filed: 07/25/2011      Page 18 of 43
7 
 
an economic topic.  A key Congressional finding providing the basis for Section 
1501 declares that it regulates “activity that is commercial and economic in nature:  
economic and financial decisions about how and when health care is paid for, and 
when health insurance is purchased,” and also targets individuals who would 
otherwise “make an economic and financial decision to forego health insurance 
coverage and attempt to self-insure.”  JA 64 (emphasis added).  In the district 
court, Defendants relied heavily upon the theory that Congress can regulate 
economic “decisions.”  Memo. Sup. Mot. Dismiss 2, 4, 19, 21, 24, 26, 27, 28.  The 
district court accepted this argument, holding that Congress’s authority extends to 
decisions that have some economic impact, even though “previous Commerce 
Clause cases have all involved physical activity, as opposed to mental activity, i.e., 
decision-making.”  JA 141, 147.  The theory that Congress can regulate “mental 
activity” or decision-making under the Commerce Clause is untenable.  Perhaps 
recognizing that, Defendants have abandoned on appeal their express reliance 
upon a Congressional power to regulate decisions and instead have recast their 
arguments purely in terms of economic activity and conduct.2/  Defendants’ revised 
arguments, like their old arguments which the district court adopted, do not justify 
the constitutionality of the individual mandate. 
                                                 
2/ Rather than fully quote the Congressional finding that Section 1501 
regulates “economic and financial decisions,” Defendants omit those words when 
referring to that finding.  Defs.’ Br. 3, 23-24. 
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B. Lawfully residing in the United States without health insurance, 
which Defendants characterize as the activity of “attempting to 
self-insure,” is not ongoing economic activity that Congress can 
regulate. 
 
 Although the failure to act (for example, not purchasing health insurance) 
may have consequences in some situations, that does not transform the failure to 
act into the kind of economic activity Congress may regulate.  The Government 
argued in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), that the laws at issue were justified by the 
economic impact of the regulated conduct, yet that did not negate the absence of 
economic activity and make those laws constitutional.  Supreme Court Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence contains a key characteristic concerning the type of 
commercial and economic activities Congress may regulate (for example, the 
manufacture, distribution, and sale of commodities):  an individual subjects 
himself to Congress’s authority by voluntarily engaging in the relevant activity and 
may place himself outside of Congress’s regulatory power by voluntarily ending 
the relevant activity.  Judicial Br. 5-15 (discussing the Supreme Court’s cases and 
definition of activity); id. at 13 (noting the analogy of a person avoiding certain 
activity to avoid personal jurisdiction); CatholicVote Br. 8-10 (same). 
 By contrast, Defendants’ novel theory would allow Congress to use the 
Commerce Clause—for the first time in our Nation’s history—to impose ongoing, 
lifetime purchase mandates on all non-exempted American adults without regard to 
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whether they engage in the type of commercial or economic activity traditionally 
subject to Congressional regulation. 
The conduct being regulated [by the individual mandate] is the 
decision not to enter the market for insurance.  Plaintiffs have not 
bought or sold a good or service, nor have they manufactured, 
distributed, or consumed a commodity. . . .  Rather, they are strangers 
to the health insurance market.  This readily differentiates the present 
case from others cited by the government. 
 
. . .  [The Government’s] argument deftly switches the focus from the 
private, non-commercial nature of plaintiffs’ conduct (the decision to 
be uninsured) to the perceived economic effects of their absence from 
the insurance market. . . .  [T]he Commerce Clause cannot be satisfied 
when economic activity is lacking in the first instance. 
 
TMLC, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13265, at *109-10 (Graham, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added).  
 Defendants rely on the “unique” nature of the health care and health 
insurance markets.3/  Under Defendants’ theory, all American adults are always 
engaged in the economic activity of “attempting to self-insure” with respect to any 
and all actual or potential “risks” for which they fail to obtain an insurance 
policy.  As one court observed, 
[i]t could just as easily be said that people without burial, life, 
supplemental income, credit, mortgage guaranty, business 
interruption, or disability insurance have made the exact same or 
similar economic and financing decisions based on their expectation 
                                                 
3/ The individual mandate is directed to the health insurance market, not the 
health care market.  It forces citizens to buy health insurance, not to use that 
insurance or participate in the health care market.  Texas Br. 13-14; Rodney Br. 8-
13. 
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that they will not incur a particular risk at a particular point in time; or 
that if they do, it is more beneficial for them to self-insure and try to 
meet their obligations out-of-pocket. . . .  The “economic decision” to 
forego virtually any and all types of insurance can (and cumulatively 
do) similarly result in significant cost-shifting to third parties. 
 
Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *100-01 (N.D. Fla. 2011).  
Acceptance of Defendants’ novel theory would expand Congress’s power to 
authorize Congress to mandate a host of purchases in a variety of markets on the 
theory that failing to make a purchase is economic “activity.” 
C. Congress’s power to regulate an economic class of activities does 
not include a novel power to regulate all uninsured Americans 
now, and indefinitely, because some will not be able to afford their 
future medical expenses. 
 
 The aggregation principle (or economic class of activities test) allows 
Congress to apply a regulation of commercial or economic activity to all 
individuals who are presently engaged in the regulated activity when their 
individual activity, taken in the aggregate with the similar conduct of others, 
substantially affects interstate commerce.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; Pls.’ Br. 29-33.  
Borrowing terminology from Commerce Clause cases, Defendants repeatedly 
assert the much broader, novel proposition that individuals who are not engaged in 
the relevant economic activity may be characterized as part of a “class” engaged in 
that activity, and regulated as such, solely because Congress cannot determine in 
advance which individuals will eventually engage in that activity.  Although 
Defendants frequently assert that “they” (the uninsured) shift costs by not paying 
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all of “their” medical debts, Defendants acknowledge that only some of those who 
are uninsured will ever incur medical costs for which they cannot pay, while many 
others will never incur such costs.  Relying on Raich, Defendants argue that 
“Congress may consider the aggregate effect of a particular category of conduct, 
and need not predict case by case whether and to what extent particular individuals 
in the class will contribute to those aggregate effects”; Defendants add, “it is 
irrelevant that some uninsured individuals may not generate uncompensated costs 
in a particular month or year.”  Defs.’ Br. 22, 27.4/  
 Defendants’ bold assertion of a power to regulate a large number of 
Americans now because some will one day engage in an economic activity is 
unsupported by Supreme Court jurisprudence; in particular, Raich provides no 
support for this “guilt by association” theory of the Commerce Clause.  Raich 
observed that “[o]ur case law firmly establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely 
local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 17.  Raich’s 
recognition of Congressional authority to apply a regulation of the national market 
for marijuana to local growers and distributors does not imply that it is irrelevant 
                                                 
4/ There is no basis in the Amended Complaint or the record to substantiate 
Defendants’ assertion that hypothetical future medical expenses would exceed 
Plaintiffs’ means just because Plaintiffs allege that the future payment of annual 
penalties impacts them now.  Defs.’ Br. 29.  Defendants admit the inability to 
predict the future, but wrongly attempt to lump Plaintiffs into the category of 
future free-loaders. 
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whether the regulated individuals are actually engaged in the regulated economic 
activity.5/ 
 Defendants’ novel theory improperly divorces the term “class” from the 
term “activities” due to Congress’s inability to predict which individuals will 
actually incur medical costs they cannot pay for in the future.  Acceptance of that 
theory requires a significant and unwarranted expansion of existing Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, one without limits and contrary to a federal government of 
“few and defined” powers.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552; Cato Br. 4-7; Texas Br. 15-17.  
 Defendants mask the novelty of their use of the class of activities language 
by citing statistics about the amount of unpaid expenses that some uninsured 
individuals incur.  It is misleading, however, for Defendants to assert that “the 
uninsured as a class” incurred a certain amount of unpaid expenses and shifted 
costs to others, implying that all or most uninsured individuals each contributed to 
the total, when in reality many uninsured individuals cover their own expenses or 
incur none at all.  It is akin to saying that residents of a city, as a “class,” commit a 
certain number of crimes every year when, in reality, most residents never commit 
a crime. 
                                                 
5/ Defendants wrongly rely on United States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884, 888, 
890 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  Lawful residence in the United States without health 
insurance is not akin to the production, distribution, and possession of child 
pornography, a marketable (albeit illegal) commodity. 
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 Defendants’ example on pages 25-26 illustrates that their reliance upon the 
class of activities test is misplaced.  Defendants cite figures stating that some 
uninsured individuals are hospitalized each year, some of those hospitalizations 
lead to bills of at least $20,000, and some of those bills are not fully paid.  In other 
words, a subset of a subset of a subset of the uninsured will not be able to pay for 
their medical expenses at some future point.  “[T]o cast the net wide enough to 
reach [all uninsured individuals] in the present, with the expectation that they will 
(or could) take those steps in the future, goes beyond the existing ‘outer limits’ of 
the Commerce Clause.”6/  Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *94-95. 
 Defendants’ reliance on “cost-shifting” is not an independent basis for 
Congress to regulate where, as here, the targeted individuals are not presently 
engaged in an economic activity.  The Government relied on a similar cost-shifting 
argument in Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64, but the Court held that Congress can only 
reach “economic activity” that substantially affects interstate commerce.  Neither 
gun possession near a school nor lawful presence in the United States without 
                                                 
6/ Defendants cite the “Economic Scholars” amici brief filed in the Eleventh 
Circuit, Defs.’ Br. 8, 27, 36, but omit mention that 105 economists filed an 
opposing amici brief in that court to refute the arguments of the Government and 
the “Economic Scholars.”  Economists’ Br. 1-4, 7-27.  Also, numerous 
organizations have explained that the individual mandate will do little to address 
the issue of uncompensated care and could actually increase the amount of medical 
costs shifted to others.  NFIB Br. 1-6; Docs Br. 3-4, 9-13, 16-18; Heritage Br. 10-
14. 
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health insurance is a class of economic activities that Congress can regulate.  Pls.’ 
Br. 14-15, 42-43; see also Texas Br. 17-20. 
Although Defendants cite 49 U.S.C. § 13906(a) to state that “[i]t is hardly 
novel for the government to require the purchase of insurance to prevent the 
externalization of costs,” Defs.’ Br. 39, that statute imposes an insurance 
requirement upon “motor carriers” that “provid[e] motor vehicle transportation for 
compensation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14) (emphasis added).  That Congress may 
regulate the commercial activity of providing transportation for a fee is 
unsurprising and irrelevant to the imposition of a lifetime health insurance 
purchase mandate upon all non-exempted Americans because they exist.7/  
Similarly, although Defendants attempt to recast Plaintiffs’ arguments as premised 
upon a constitutional right “to consume health care services without insurance and 
to pass costs on to other market participants,” Defs.’ Br. 52, the issue is whether 
Congress has exceeded its constitutional authority by enacting Section 1501.8/ 
                                                 
7/ Defendants rely on Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 222 
(1938), Defs.’ Br. 38-39, which held that federal authority to regulate labor 
disputes affecting interstate commerce is broad and may include “reasonable 
preventive measures.”  Consolidated Edison does not suggest that Congress may 
proactively regulate those who are not presently engaged in an economic activity 
to prevent undesirable future economic activity by others. 
 
8/ Defendants state that for a facial challenge to succeed there can be no 
constitutional application of the law.  Defs.’ Br. 45 (citing United States v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739 (1987)).  Plaintiffs, though, are challenging Congress’s authority to 
enact Section 1501.  Because Section 1501 is ultra vires, it is unconstitutional in 
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D. Congress’s power to regulate a market does not give it the power 
to indefinitely regulate a citizen who once participated in that 
market, or who may one day participate in that market. 
 
 Defendants argue that the individual mandate merely regulates the “timing 
and method of payment” individuals use to pay for their own health care services, 
which virtually all Americans will receive at some point.  Defs.’ Br. 1.  This 
argument rests on several flawed premises. 
 Defendants’ reliance on the perceived inevitability of the need to participate 
in the market for health care services ignores the absence of any ongoing, 
continuous economic activity that would indefinitely subject all Americans to 
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause.  Defendants characterize all 
Americans as lifetime “participants in the health care market” that can be 
indefinitely regulated, Defs.’ Br. 42, but an individual’s actual participation in the 
health care market (for example, a visit to a doctor or hospital) is occasional, 
sporadic, or virtually non-existent for many Americans, including Plaintiff Lee, 
who does not use any medical care based on his religious beliefs.  JA 20.  That an 
individual once received health care services does not make him a lifetime 
“participant” in the health care services market that Congress can continuously 
regulate.  Defendants do not point to a single case in which a court has upheld a 
                                                                                                                                                             
all applications.  TMLC, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13265, at *100-01 (Graham, J., 
dissenting) (“Lopez and Morrison struck down statutes as facially unconstitutional 
under the Commerce Clause and did so without reference to Salerno.”); Virginia, 
728 F. Supp. 2d at 773-74 (Salerno does not apply). 
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statute, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, on the grounds that because some 
individuals had engaged in an economic activity (or will engage in an economic 
activity), Congress could continue to regulate them indefinitely when they were no 
longer engaging in that economic activity.  Similarly, that some individuals have 
maintained health insurance coverage for a period of time in the past does not 
mean they are lifetime participants in the health insurance market and can be 
indefinitely regulated by Congress. 
 Moreover, Defendants wrongly state that Section 1501 “regulates the way 
people pay for health care services.”  Defs.’ Br. 18.  Defendants characterize 
Section 1501 as if it were a transaction-based provision requiring medical 
professionals to impose an additional fee whenever patients meeting certain 
requirements are not enrolled in an insurance program.  Section 1501, however, 
requires all Americans to indefinitely maintain health insurance coverage without 
regard to when and whether they actually receive health care services. 
[T]he government’s argument turns the mandate into something it is 
not.  The requirement that all citizens obtain health insurance does not 
depend on them receiving health care services in the first place.  
Individuals must carry insurance each and every month regardless of 
whether they have actually entered the market for health services.  
Simply put, the mandate does not regulate the commercial activity of 
obtaining health care.  It regulates the status of being uninsured. 
 
TMLC, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13265, at *106 (Graham, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
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 Defendants characterize Plaintiffs’ arguments concerning the individual 
mandate’s constitutionality as an invalid objection to the timing of the mandate, 
faulting Plaintiffs for drawing a line between Section 1501’s mandate to 
indefinitely maintain health insurance and a hypothetical law imposing an 
additional fee at the time medical services are obtained whenever patients meeting 
certain requirements are not enrolled in an insurance program.  Defs.’ Br. 18, 37, 
45.  The distinction Plaintiffs draw, however, is based on the clear difference 
between the legitimate Congressional power to regulate ongoing commercial and 
economic activities and the illegitimate assertion of a Congressional power to 
mandate that individuals not presently engaged in a commercial or economic 
activity must do so.  Plaintiffs’ objection is to ultra vires compulsion, not mere 
timing. 
 In addition, Defendants wrongly state that Section 1501 “regulates the way 
participants in the health care market pay for the services they obtain.” Defs.’ Br. 
42 (emphasis added).  Defendants imply that Section 1501 merely requires each 
individual to pay for his own eventual future health care services in advance 
(similar to a health care savings account).  To the contrary, Section 1501 requires 
millions of Americans to pay indefinitely into the risk-based private health 
insurance system, which will then cover a portion of some individuals’ future 
health care expenses.  Some individuals will end up benefiting from the system by 
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receiving more in subsidized expenses than they pay in premiums, while others 
will end up subsidizing the costs of others by paying more in premiums than they 
receive in subsidized expenses.  The Commerce Clause does not authorize 
Congress to force all Americans into the private insurance system so that some 
individuals will subsidize others’ medical costs. 
E. The Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses do not 
authorize Congress to force citizens to enter and indefinitely 
remain in a market to benefit voluntary market participants or 
prevent adverse consequences from Congress’s regulation of that 
market. 
 
 Defendants rely on Raich in asserting that Congress has the authority to 
require all Americans to buy and indefinitely maintain health insurance because, 
without that mandate, other PPACA provisions imposing requirements on 
insurance companies to benefit individuals who desire to buy health insurance 
would cause the health insurance market to collapse.  Defs.’ Br. 30-34.  Although 
Defendants rely on the interstate character of the health care and health insurance 
markets, Congress’s extensive regulation of insurance providers, and the 
Government’s operation of public insurance programs, those facts do not support 
the novel assertion of a power to force all Americans into a market until they die.9/ 
                                                 
9/ Defendants’ statement that “[i]t is difficult to conceive of statutory 
provisions more clearly economic than the ones here,” Defs.’ Br. 48 (emphasis 
added), is meaningless.  What matters is that the regulated individuals are 
presently engaging in economic activity, not that the statute mandating they enter a 
market can be characterized as “economic.” 
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  In Raich, the Court rejected an as-applied challenge to a concededly valid 
federal law regulating the interstate market for marijuana, holding that it could be 
applied to local economic activity (growing and distributing marijuana).  Raich 
relied heavily on the key difference between cases such as Lopez, Morrison, and 
the present case alleging that a federal law exceeds Congress’s power (facial 
challenges), and cases, such as Raich, challenging a specific application of an 
admittedly valid law (as-applied challenges).  See Raich, 545 U.S. at 23.  The 
Court considered the distinction “pivotal.”  Id. 
 The Court concluded in Raich, as in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942), that preventing Congress from reaching the regulated economic activities 
at the local level would “undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that 
commodity” and “leave a gaping hole in” the national regulation of that economic 
activity.  Id. at 18, 22.  Unlike in Lopez, in Raich, reaching the local economic 
activity was an “essential part[] of a larger regulation of economic activity, in 
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were 
regulated.”  Id. at 24-25 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).  These statements 
signified only that, in the context of an as-applied challenge to an unquestionably 
constitutional regulation of economic activity nationwide, Congress may reach that 
existing economic activity at the local level.  Raich and Wickard do not even 
remotely suggest any authority to require individuals who are not presently 
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engaged in a commercial or economic activity to do so to benefit voluntary market 
participants or prevent negative consequences of Congress’s regulation of the 
market.10/ 
 Defendants rely heavily upon selective quotes from Justice Scalia’s 
concurring opinion in Raich that illustrate Congress’s power to regulate local 
activities.  Defs.’ Br. 19, 34, 38, 46-47.  That concurring opinion provides no 
support for Section 1501.  For example, Justice Scalia observed that when the 
Government asserts that it must include local activity as a necessary part of a 
regulation of interstate commerce, as it did in Raich, “[t]he relevant question is 
simply whether the means chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a 
legitimate end under the commerce power.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941)).  Compelling 
an American citizen to purchase a product is not reasonably adapted to a legitimate 
end.  Virginia, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 782; see also Authors’ Br. 1-31. 
Defendants also selectively quote portions of United States v. Comstock, 130 
S. Ct. 1949 (2010), to suggest that a rational claim that the means chosen bear 
some connection to a perceived “necessity” is all that is required to establish a 
valid claim of authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Defendants 
                                                 
10/ Likewise, Defendants’ reliance on Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 
n.17 (1981), Defs.’ Br. 30, is misplaced; the statute there did not compel 
involuntary economic activity as does the individual mandate. 
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notably fail to mention, however, that the Court’s analysis hinged upon “five 
considerations, taken together”: 
(1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause, (2) the long 
history of federal involvement in this arena, (3) the sound reasons for 
the statute’s enactment in light of the Government’s custodial interest 
in safeguarding the public from dangers posed by those in federal 
custody, (4) the statute’s accommodation of state interests, and (5) the 
statute’s narrow scope. 
 
Id. at 1956, 1965. 
 Application of these factors is consistent with the Court’s longstanding 
insistence that the end must be “legitimate” and “within the scope of the 
constitution,” and the means must be “appropriate” and consistent with “the letter 
and spirit of the constitution.”  Id. at 1956 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. 316, 421 (1819)).  Necessity is insufficient where, as here, the means chosen 
are not proper.  The Necessary and Proper Clause is not a Machiavellian ends-
justify-all-means provision. 
 The individual mandate fails the Comstock factors.  Pls.’ Br. 48-49.  Section 
1501 is not a modest addition to existing law, is unprecedented in the history of the 
United States, is not narrow in scope, does not accommodate State interests 
(illustrated by the twenty-eight States currently challenging the PPACA), and rests 
upon numerous attenuated inferences.  The newly-asserted Congressional power to 
force Americans to buy goods or services to benefit voluntary market participants 
is by no means “appropriate” and consistent with “the letter and spirit of the 
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constitution.”  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956; see also Bond v. United States, 2011 
U.S. LEXIS 4558, at *29 (U.S. 2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[A] law beyond 
the power of Congress, for any reason, is no law at all.”) (quotations and citation 
omitted). 
F. Defendants’ arguments have no limiting principle and would 
convert the Commerce Clause into a federal police power. 
 
 Defendants largely ignore Lopez, a case in which the Court clearly expressed 
the importance of “consider[ing] the implications of Defendants’ arguments” 
where, as here, the outer bounds of the Commerce Clause power are tested, to 
preserve the constitutional system of federalism.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.  As 
Justice Kennedy noted in his concurring opinion in Comstock, assertions of power 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause are not given mere cursory judicial review, 
as Defendants imply, but must be closely examined to gauge their impact on 
principles of federalism.  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1966-69 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); Bond, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4558, at *17-19 (discussing the important 
role of federalism in our system of government); Cato Br. 7-17, 25-30; Texas Br. 
15-25. 
Lopez indicates that considering the kind of hypothetical legislation the 
Government’s theory of the Commerce Clause would authorize is key;  acceptance 
of an assertion of power in one case will trigger similar assertions of power in the 
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future.  Although the statute in Lopez regulated the possession of guns in a school 
zone, the Court observed that, 
[u]nder the theories that the Government presents in support of § 
922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even 
in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States 
historically have been sovereign.  Thus, if we were to accept the 
Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by 
an individual that Congress is without power to regulate. 
 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64.  As such, Defendants cannot dodge the far-reaching 
implications of their arguments by simply characterizing the kinds of laws that 
would be supported by their arguments as “far-fetched” and “imaginary.”  Defs.’ 
Br. 50, 51. 
 Plaintiffs reiterate that Defendants’ novel theories supporting the individual 
mandate would also support a mandate that all Americans above a certain income 
level buy a General Motors vehicle so long as it was accompanied by a mandate 
that GM dealers provide vehicles to all who demonstrate a need for them 
regardless of their ability to pay.  Pls.’ Br. 39-40; JA 212-13.  In response, 
Defendants rely on the existence of EMTALA as a purported limiting principle, 
stating that “health care is different” because “no state or federal law requires GM 
dealers to give away vehicles to those who cannot pay.”  Defs.’ Br. 51.  That 
Defendants must change the hypothetical, which includes a mandate imposed upon 
dealers, speaks volumes and is a tacit admission that a mandate to buy a GM 
vehicle would be valid under Defendants’ theory if it were coupled with a dealer 
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mandate.  Given the many ways in which Defendants’ arguments would expand 
Congressional power far beyond existing law, it is no wonder why Defendants 
attempt to gloss over the implications of their arguments. 
 Defendants’ purported limiting principle of “uniqueness,” and the assurance 
that similar measures would never be attempted in other markets, are illusory.  
There is a large measure of uniqueness, unpredictability, suddenness, and risk in 
many aspects of life, and many of the justifications Defendants offer in favor of the 
individual mandate—that individuals’ decisions not to buy something have some 
economic impact, that voluntary market participants would benefit if others were 
required to join the market, etc.—are equally applicable to other markets.  Pls.’ Br. 
34-36; Cato Br. 21-24.  
 In addition, there are many markets in which some level of sporadic 
participation is virtually “inevitable,” yet perceived inevitability is not a 
justification for imposing mandates upon individuals regardless of when or 
whether they actually participate in that market.  It does not take much to go from a 
mandate to buy health insurance to a mandate to buy certain foods or pay a penalty 
given individuals’ inevitable need for food.  Putting aside the red herring of due 
process objections to a mandate to eat certain foods, Defs.’ Br. 51-52, Defendants 
offer no explanation why their arguments supporting the individual mandate would 
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not also support a mandate to buy certain foods since the failure to buy those foods 
ultimately impacts the economy. 
 In sum, the individual mandate is much like the laws at issue in Lopez and 
Morrison in that they are not triggered by the occurrence of an economic activity, 
but are premised upon broad theories of Commerce Clause power that are 
inconsistent with our system of limited, enumerated federal power.11/ 
 G. Response to Amici Supporting Defendants 
 Amici supporting Defendants filed thirteen briefs reiterating each others’ 
arguments ad nausem, contrary to D.C. Cir. R. 29(d), even including mistaken 
references to a district court decision invalidating Section 1501 obviously drawn 
from briefs filed in other courts.  NWLC Br. 12; ANA Br. 9.  The briefs illustrate 
that Defendants’ theories lack limiting principles, arguing that Congress may 
mandate the purchase of a product to make it more affordable, Mass. Br. 7; AARP 
Br. 3, 5; Econ. Schol. Br. 16, improve Americans’ health and productivity, AAPD 
Br. 22, and improve efficiency in federal spending programs, ANA Br. 5-6, 14-15. 
 Furthermore, Article I, Section 8 does not provide Congress with an 
amorphous “problem-solving” power akin to the States’ police powers as several 
amici allege.  Maryland Br. 6-8; Friedman Br. 1-2, 9; Const. Acct. Br. 11-12, 27.  
                                                 
11/ Because the district court did not address severability, this Court should 
remand on that point.  Pls.’ Br. 50 n.9, 58; see also Chamber Br. 2-30 (Section 
1501 is not severable from the PPACA). 
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Amici’s attempt to compare Section 1501 to civil rights statutes applicable to 
businesses, employers, landlords, etc. is flawed; Section 1501’s mandate is not 
triggered by continuous, voluntary commercial or economic activity.  NWLC Br. 
20-22; AHA Br. 20-21; Pls.’ Br. 33.  Moreover, Congress requiring militiamen to 
purchase weapons in 1792 under the enumerated power to “raise and support 
armies,” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, and the fact that an action-inaction distinction was 
not drawn with respect to the common law definition of suicide, are irrelevant to 
Section 1501’s unprecedented mandate to buy a product premised upon the 
Commerce Clause.  Friedman Br. 31; Const. Acct. Br. 31; Maryland Br. 28; ANA 
Br. 9; Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296-97 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS’ 
RFRA CLAIM. 
 
 Plaintiffs Lee and Seven-Sky have set forth a “short and plain statement” 
that they have a plausible claim for relief under RFRA by alleging facts showing 
that the individual mandate substantially burdens their religious exercise by 
placing substantial pressure on them to violate their religious beliefs or be 
penalized for adhering to those beliefs.  JA 20-24, 37-38; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); 42 
U.S.C. § 2000bb-1; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009); 
Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 682 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  Plaintiffs’ factual 
allegations must be considered true, and from those facts this Court can draw the 
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reasonable inference of Defendants’ liability.  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-54.  The 
district court, however, overlooked the sufficient allegations in Plaintiffs’ 
Amended Complaint and instead wrongly imposed a heightened pleading standard.  
Pls.’ Br. 54-55.12/ 
 Defendants avoid any response to Plaintiffs’ contention that the district 
court’s dismissal of their RFRA claim conflicts with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398 (1963), the case upon which RFRA was modeled.  Pls.’ Br. 52-54.  Consistent 
with the holding in Sherbert, Plaintiffs alleged that the individual mandate “forces 
[Seven-Sky and Lee] to choose between following the precepts of [their] religion 
and [paying annual penalties], on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts 
of [their] religion . . . on the other hand.”  Pls.’ Br. 53; JA 20-24, 37-38.  Sherbert 
is dispositive and compels the reversal of the district court’s order. 
 Defendants have recast Plaintiffs’ arguments by wrongly analogizing 
Plaintiffs’ claim to a complaint about the spending of tax dollars.  Plaintiffs are not 
objecting to how the Government spends tax dollars.  Lee and Seven-Sky’s 
consistent objection is to being forced to join the health insurance system, which 
                                                 
12/ Plaintiffs amended their original complaint “as a matter of course” before 
Defendants’ responsive pleading was filed.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1).  Even if a 
heightened pleading standard were permissible, which it is not, this Court should 
remand for the district court to grant Plaintiffs leave to re-allege their RFRA claims 
to satisfy those heightened requirements.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court 
should freely give leave [to amend a complaint] when justice so requires.”); Iqbal, 
129 S. Ct. at 1954. 
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substantially burdens their religious exercise.  Pls.’ Br. 50-57; JA 20-24, 37-38.  
Also, Lee and Seven-Sky’s circumstances are not the same as those who claim a 
violation of RFRA but have alternative ways to exercise their religion.  E.g.,  
Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  Section 1501 requires 
Lee and Seven-Sky to purchase health insurance, which runs counter to their 
religious faith, or pay a penalty for following their religious faith.  They have no 
other valid options.13/ 
 Lastly, Defendants fail to show—as RFRA requires—that applying the 
individual mandate to Lee and Seven-Sky is the least restrictive means of achieving 
a compelling governmental interest.  Kaemmerling, 553 F.3d at 682 (the 
compelling interest test must be satisfied through application of the law “to the 
person.”).  Defendants can only say that “Congress was not required” to exempt 
Lee or Seven-Sky since they do not fit within the narrow religious exemptions 
Congress included in Section 1501.  Defs.’ Br. 61-62.  RFRA does not require Lee 
and Seven-Sky to change their religious beliefs to conform to what Congress has 
approved—for example, to join the Amish faith or a health care sharing ministry—
in order to receive RFRA’s protections.  Instead, RFRA requires Defendants to 
                                                 
13/ Defendants imply that Plaintiffs have the option of buying health 
insurance and not using it, which is the equivalent of Congress compelling a 
religious person to buy pornography to help the economy because he has the option 
of not looking at it, even though the purchase violates his religion.  As stated in the 
Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs’ forced entry into the health insurance system itself 
violates their religious beliefs.  JA 19-24, 37-38. 
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show that Congress’s imposition of the individual mandate on Lee and Seven-Sky 
is the least restrictive means available, that is, that Congress has no alternative 
forms of regulation that would accomplish the Government’s compelling interest 
while imposing less of a burden upon Plaintiffs’ religious exercise.  Kaemmerling, 
553 F.3d at 684.  Defendants have not made that showing. 
CONCLUSION 
 This Court should reverse the district court’s decision for the reasons stated 
herein and in the Opening Brief and remand for further proceedings. 
 Respectfully submitted on July 25, 2011, 
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